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Abstract. The complexity of modern systems on the one
hand and the rising threat of intentional electromagnetic in-
terference (IEMI) on the other hand increase the necessity for
systematical risk analysis. Most of the problems can not be
treated deterministically since slight changes in the configu-
ration (source, position, polarization, . . . ) can dramatically
change the outcome of an event. For that purpose, meth-
ods known from probabilistic risk analysis can be applied.
One of the most common approaches is the fault tree analy-
sis (FTA). The FTA is used to determine the system failure
probability and also the main contributors to its failure. In
this paper the fault tree analysis is introduced and a possible
application of that method is shown using a small computer
network as an example. The constraints of this methods are
explained and conclusions for further research are drawn.
1 Introduction
The complexity of modern electronic systems such as IT net-
works does not allow to examine the susceptibility of that
systems against intentional EMI (IEMI) solely deterministi-
cally (Garcia, 2008; Mansson et al., 2009; Holland and John,
1999). The reason for this are the uncertainties associated
with the analysis:
– Sources: There are a lot of different types of sources
with different characteristics (Giri and Tesche, 2004).
To each source the system might respond differently.
– Coupling paths: Depending on the position of the
source or its orientation different coupling paths are
dominant.
– System behavior: For the same source, same position
and same orientation the system might fail or not, which
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is a random event regarding the huge number of internal
states of the system (Camp et al., 2004).
The aspects described above are typically out of analysts con-
trol. It is not possible to determine which type of source the
attacker is going use or how he is going to position it. Hence,
these uncertainties need to be treated statistically. Further-
more, there are aspects which can be determined exactly
however because of the complexity of the system have to be
estimated. The electromagnetic field inside a shielded room
depends on so many factors that the deterministic calculation
becomes impossible. The application of worst case scenar-
ios and safety factors will make the system overprotected and
thus too expensive. That is why simple hardening against all
sources and all possible situations cannot be done. Further-
more, the question about the risk that the systems is exposed
to remains still unanswered. Hence, the system needs to be
analyzed statistically taking the uncertainties into considera-
tion.
Methods for analyzing the system reliability and risk have
been developed and used for many years. Especially the nu-
clear and the aerospace industries have made a lot of progress
in this area (Stamatelatos, 2002). When analyzing the risk of
a complex system it is important to proceed systematically.
For that, the fault tree analysis (FTA) is an important tool.
In Sect. 2 a short introduction to fault tree analysis is given.
Then in Sect. 3 a computer network is introduced for which
the reliability analysis is carried out. Section 4 is the main
section and discusses how the fault tree for the computer net-
work can be developed. First the functional and then IEMI
specific dependencies are modeled. The restrictions of FTA
associated with that are discussed.
2 Fault tree analysis
It is difficult to predict the failure probability of the whole
system in a certain electromagnetic environment at once. By
decomposing its failure behavior in smaller scenarios the de-
scription becomes possible. This principle is also used in
Published by Copernicus Publications on behalf of the URSI Landesausschuss in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.
298 E. Genender et al.: On the use of fault tree analysis for IEMIE. Genender et al.: On the Use of Fault Tree Analysis for IEMI 5
Server
Cable 1
Cable 2
PC 2
PC 1
Volume 0
Volume 1
shield
Fig. 1. Network which reliability is to be determined
Compatibility, pp. 226–231, 2009.
Stamatelatos, M.: Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Procedures Guide
for NASA Managers and Practitioners, NASA, version 1.1 edn.,
2002.
Vesely, W.: Fault Tree Handbook with Aerospace Applications,
NASA, 2002.
Server
PC 2
PC 1
Fig. 2. Reliability block diagram for the network from Fig. 1
OR
FSys
FSer FPC1&2
AND
FPC1 FPC2
Fig. 3. Fault tree for the top event System fails FSys
OR
FSer
FSer,C FSer,R
OR
FSer,C2FSer,C1
Fig. 4. Fault tree for the top event Server failed
OR
F
Ser,C1
F
Ser,C1
source x
F
Ser,C1
source y
Fig. 5. Fault tree for the event Server failed through conducted
disturbance on cable 1
F
Ser,C1
source x
source x FSer,C1,Sx
AND
Fig. 6. Fault tree for the event Server failed through conducted
disturbance on cable 1 through sourceX
Fig. 7. Redundant two component system
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put events occur
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Output occurs if at least one of
the input events occurs
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i . .
the electromagnetic topology concept. In order to analyze
the system reliability the fault tree analysis (FTA) can be ap-
plied (Vesely, 2002). Using the FTA for analyzing a sys-
tem exposed to an EMP was first mentioned by National Re-
search Council (1984). However, as far as the authors know,
FTA has never been applied for that purpose. The FTA is a
deductive method: beginning with an undesired event (also
called the top event) the FTA is used to find the causes for
this top event. When determining the causes, a fault tree is
constructed from top to bottom. For its construction several
symbols are used that indicate the relation between different
events. The main symbols are presented in Table 1.
3 Computer network under test
In order to present the application of FTA, a computer net-
work is introduced in Fig. 1. The network is placed in a
(shielded) room and consists of one server and two comput-
ers (PCs). The two PCs are connected to the server. Both
PCs fulfill the same function and are thus redundant. Now
the task is to analyze the system reliability when it is ex-
posed to an electromagnetic interference. It is assumed that
the interferenc source is outside of the shielded room.
The first step of the analysis is to determine the functional
dependencies of the system. A reliability block diagram is
Table 1. Fault tree symbols.
Symbol Name Meaning
Intermediate
Event
An event is caused by combi-
nation of other events
Basic Event
A basic event requiring no fur-
ther development
AND Gate
Output occurs if all of the in-
put events occur
OR Gate
Output occurs if at least one of
the input events occurs
used to visualize the dependency of the overall system on the
functionality of its elements. Each element of the system is
represented by a block. The blocks are connected depending
on their function in the system. A serial connection of two
blocks means that both blocks are needed for the success-
f l operation of the system. A parallel connection of blocks
means that at least one of the blocks is needed. The system
operates successfully if a path between the left and the right
end of the reliability block diagram exists in which all blocks
are functioning. The reliability block diagram for the intro-
duced computer network is shown in Fig. 2.
4 Fault tree analysis of the computer network
4.1 Fault tree for system failure
At the beginning of each FTA the top event is defined. For
this event the causes are then determined successively. For
the network under test different events might be defined. The
determination of all possible top events cannot be done with
FTA. For that other tools need to be used. Possible top events
could be permanent damage of the network, degradation of
the performance, temporal uncontrollability of the network
and so on. In this paper the top event is simply defined as the
failure of the whole system which is denoted as FSys.
From the reliability block diagram in Fig. 2 it is concluded
that the system fails, if the server fails or the redundant (par-
allel) system consisting of the two PCs fails. That relation is
depicted in Fig. 3 by the OR connection of the events Server
fails FSer and Redundant system (PC1&2) fails FPC1&2. The
event FPC1&2 is further developed as the AND connection of
the events FPC1 and FPC2. Using Boolean algebra the system
failure event can be described as:
FSys = FSer∪FPC1&2
= FSer∪(FPC1∩FPC2) (1)
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4.2 Fault tree for the serv failure event
The fault tree which is developed until here is not directly
related to IEMI problems and the main focus is on functional
dependencies. The causes of the bottom events in Fig. 3 how-
ever are related to IEMI. For each of the bottom events a fault
tree needs to be developed. In thi pap r we take a closer
look at the failure behavior of the server FSer. Hence, the
new top event is defined as Server failed (FSer). The fault
tree which is going to be developed for this event can later
just be attached at the corresponding position of the fault tree
in Fig. 3.
Typically, electric equipment can be disturbed by radi-
ated or conducted interference. Hence, the next step is to
model the failure of the server as an OR connection of the
events Server failed through conducted disturbance (FSer,C)
and Server failed through radiated disturbance (FSer,R), see
Fig. 4.
Those two events require further analysis. In Fig. 1 it
can be seen that two cables are connected to the server.
Hence, the event Server failed through conducted distur-
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bance (FSer,C) can be developed as the combination of the
events Server failed through conducted disturbance on ca-
ble 1 (FSer,C1) and Server failed through conducted distur-
bance on cable 2 (FSer,C2). The top event has been decom-
posed into lower level events that are easier to analyze for
themselves. Using Boolean algebra the server failure event
can be described as:
FSer = FSer,C∪FSer,R
= FSer,C1∪FSer,C2∪FSer,R (2)
4.3 Fault tree for the server failure through disturbance
on cable 1
At this point there is a need to know how susceptible the
server at different ports is. The susceptibility of each port
depends on the type of the source. In Brauer et al. (2009) it
is shown that different types of cables are susceptible to dif-
ferent types of pulses. For example in Brauer et al. (2009) it
is shown that, an ultra wideband (UWB) source couples well
to network cables, damped sinusoid (DS) source to power
supply and high power microwave (HPM) into the casing of
the analyzed equipment. Hence, at this point of the fault tree
failures through different sources are distinguished. For each
cable only those sources need to be taken into consideration,
which are important for this type of cable. In this paper the
event Server failed through conducted disturbance on cable 1
(FSer,C1) is further developed. It is assumed that the server
is susceptible on cable 1 to source x and sources y, which is
depicted in the fault tree in Fig. 5.
In order for the server to fail through source x this source
needs to occur and given the presence of the source x the
server has to fail. Let’s assume that the source is a high-
altitude EMP (HEMP). This event has a very low probability,
let’s say 1%. However, given the occurrence of the source the
probability that the server fails is very high, let’s say 80%.
Then the probability of the server to fail through a HEMP is
0.01 ·0.8= 0.008. This relation can b d picted as an AND
connection as can be seen in Fig. 6.
As both events at the bottom of the fault tree are basic
events the fault tree development for this branch is finished
www.adv-radio-sci.net/9/297/2011/ Adv. Radio Sci., 9, 297–302, 2011
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and has to be continued for other branches. When all
branches are finished the fault tree can be solved.
5 Solution and restrictions of the fault tree
The fault tree is developed top-down and solved bottom-up.
This means that the probabilities of the basic events have to
be defined and then propagated through the fault tree. In the
fault tree in Fig. 6 the basic events are the probability of the
source and the failure probabilities of the elements given a
certain source. These basic events are analyzed in the fol-
lowing.
5.1 Source likelihoods
In order to determine the source likelihoods (Sabath and
Garbe, 2009) suggest to evaluate the mobility and the tech-
nological challenge of a source. The smaller and lighter the
source is th higher is its mobility. The technological chal-
lenge combines quantities such as the level of knowledge
needed to design or operate the system, availability of com-
ponents and costs. The lower the technological challenge
and the higher the mobility of a source is, the higher is its
likelihood.
5.2 Failure probability of components
The failure probability of single elements can be estimated
from the knowledge of strength (failure threshold) of the
equipment and the stress which the equipment is exposed to.
5.2.1 Estimation of the strength of the components
The strength can be measured or estimated in a separate ar-
rangement by inducing different voltages on the cable and
then collecting the failure statistics of the device. Another
option is to estimate the strength from the experience of the
EMC engineer or from the known strengths of similar equip-
ment.
In previous research, Camp et al. (2004) have shown that
the strength (breakdown failure rate (BFR)) can be described
by the Weibull distribution. The parameters of that distri-
bution are however dependent on the shape of the radiated
electromagnetic pulse. For different pulse shapes different
breakdown behavior is expected. Using the window norms in
frequency domain the energy- and amplitude efficiency fac-
tors (Nitsch et al., 2004) can be calculated. With the help
of the energy- and amplitude efficiency factors the break-
down behavior for one pulse shape can be estimated from
the knowledge of the breakdown behavior for another pulse
shape.
5.2.2 Estimation of the stress
Besides the strength of the components the knowledge of the
stress that the elements are exposed to is required. For that
the principles of the electromagnetic (EM) topology can be
applied (Baum, 1980). The main idea of EM topology is the
same as in fault tree analysis: a complex system is decom-
posed into smaller subsystems. That way, the subsystems
can be analyzed independently. In order to analyze the EM
topology the whole system is divided into subvolumes which
are separated by surfaces. A surface can be represented by a
transfer function from one volume to another. Having the ab-
solute knowledge of the situation including information like
the exact positions of the objects, material parameters, angle
of incident of electromagnetic wave, there would be no need
to analyze the system statistically. In reality, we don’t posses
the absolute knowledge of the situation but a certain degree
of belief or expectation about the true situation and thus we
have uncertainties. Statistical analysis of coupling on cables
in shielded environments is well described by Holland and
John (1999). In the classical EM topology concept however,
the uncertainties are not taken into account.
In order to take the uncertainties into consideration, the
classical topological concept needs to be extended. Not only
the transfer functions need to be considered but also the un-
certainties of these transfer functions.
In order to analyze the system statistically there are two
conceivable ways. The first way is to extend the topology
concept in order to include the uncertainties and then to use
the results as input data for the fault tree. The second way
is to further extend the fault tree and to include the effects
of shielding and propagation in this fault tree. By choosing
the fault tree analysis, the whole system can be described by
one model. There are however restrictions of the fault tree.
The events in the tree are binary. Continuous values, such
as field strength or shielding effectiveness, can be included
if the symbols of the fault tree are extended. However the
more serious restriction is that a disturbance in the electro-
magnetic topology graph can take several paths to each sys-
tem element. Trying to implement this parallel paths in the
fault tree is difficult and for some cases even impossible. Be-
cause of that the classical topology should be used in order
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to describe the stress which the components are exposed to.
For that the classical topology needs to be extended in order
to include the uncertainties. This can be achieved by assign-
ing the transfer function between two volumes uncertainties.
This uncertainty can be described by single values such as the
standard deviations or by whole probability density function.
For example, instead of using just a shielding effectiveness
value of 40 dB, a pair consisting of the expected shielding
value and its standard deviation can be used and propagated
through the topology tree such as (40 dB, ± 10 dB).
6 Common cause failures
In our previous research we have measured the failure prob-
ability of a redundant two component system depicted in
Fig. 7. It was observed that depending on the wiring of
the system there was a strong dependency between the two
components. This dependency has a very strong influence
on the redundancy and thus on the failure probability of the
whole system. In classical risk analysis this type of failure
is called Common Cause Failures (CCF). There are several
models that try to include the CCF into the overall model
(Bedford and Cooke, 2001, pp. 140–152). In order to in-
clude the common cause failures in our model the fault tree
can be extended. However, before that the common cause
have to be analyzed. It is part of our future work to predict
the dependencies of the failures in interconnected systems.
7 Summary and conclusions
In this paper an example is shown of how a fault tree for
a complex system exposed to IEMI can be developed. For
that, the first step is the analysis of functional dependencies
and scenarios that can lead to system failure. In the next step
a differentiation is made between the different ways the EM
interference can disturb the system. For that, radiated and
conducted interference are modeled separately in the fault
tree. Furthermore a distinction is made between the differ-
ent entrance points of conducted interference. Hereafter, a
distinction between different IEMI sources is made. It is dis-
cussed how the source likelihoods can be estimated and how
the breakdown strength can be analyzed and determined in
a separate setup. In order to model the disturbance two ap-
proaches are possible. The first approach is the classical elec-
tromagnetic topology approach. However, the uncertainties
associated with modeling and the randomness of events must
be included into the topology concept. The second approach
is the further development of the fault tree. Because of the
restrictions of the fault tree to model parallel propagation of
the disturbance a sugestion is made to extend the classical
topology concept in order to include statistical aspects.
The calculation of the probability of the top event and of
the uncertainties associated with it is one part of the fault
tree analysis. The other and not less important parts are the
sensitivity and importance analysis. With the help of sen-
sitivity analysis it is possible to determine how sensitive the
model (result) reacts regarding changes of the model parame-
ters. That way, it can be determined which model parameters
should be modeled more precisely and which model parame-
ters are less important and can thus be estimated roughly. In
so doing, the efficiency of modeling time and effort can be
improved. The importance analysis (Genender et al., 2010)
is closely related to sensitivity analysis. With the help of
importance analysis the significance of the system elements
can be analyzed in regard to different aspects of the system
behavior. Using the quantities like critical importance, risk
reduction worth importance or risk achievement worth im-
portance it is possible to determine the elements from which
improvement the system will benefit most or the elements
from which degradation the system will suffer least. Taking
the importance measures into consideration, the system reli-
ability can be improved systematically and cost-efficiently.
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